Piketty, Meade and Predistribution by O'Neill, Martin
Piketty, Meade and Predistribution 
 
For a Crooked Timber  seminar on Thomas Piketty’s Capi ta l  in  the  Twenty -Firs t  Century  
http://crookedtimber.org/  
 
Martin O’Neill 
University of York 
 
Draft – 29 May 2015 
Comments welcome 
martin.oneill@york.ac.uk  
 
 
Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century1 presents a troubling puzzle for social 
democrats and for parties of the centre-left, as well as for academics interested in developing a 
more egalitarian public policy agenda. Supported by a previously unimagined wealth of statistical 
detail, gained through the archival labour over many years of a large team of researchers, 
Piketty’s book confirms profound concerns about the long-range dynamics of capitalism. Wealth 
does not naturally disperse down to the many, but sticks to the few, and especially to those who 
carry the arbitrary advantages of patrimonial inheritance. The facts of inequality are devastating, 
and come with an accompanying sense of deflation at the level of policy and political action. We 
may have come to see the grim facts of capitalism’s internal dynamics more clearly than ever 
before, but it is much less clear that we have the tools to cure capitalism’s disfiguring disease of 
accelerating inequality. Hence we see that a common reaction to Piketty’s work on the left is one 
of resignation or even despair. The sardonic good humour and cautious optimism displayed by 
Piketty himself can seem oddly out of place against the background picture that has been created 
by his years of ground-breaking research. 
 
The sense that Piketty’s book should be seen as a deeply pessimistic one is brought into full 
focus when we consider the single policy proposal for which he is best known: that is, the idea of 
a progressive global wealth tax. Such a tax would involve unprecedented levels of cooperation 
between international tax authorities, alongside a massive shift in the level of detail in reporting 
the ownership and transfer of both financial and non-financial wealth. Such a proposal sounds 
like pie in the sky: a wonderful policy if we somehow had a magic wand to change the nature of 
both the world financial system and of its various (often highly competitive) fiscal systems 
overnight, but a position inaccessible any time soon from our current circumstances. If we 
imagine states that could enact the policy that Piketty endorses, then we seem at the same time to 
be imagining a world in which the concrete problems of unequal power and unequal political 
influence that are created by large economic inequalities are somehow dissolved. Piketty’s hoped-
for fiscal fix would seem to involve an impossible act of political bootstrapping. 
 
However, it seems to me that commentators have been too quick both to reduce the 
implications of Piketty’s book to the headline proposals of more aggressive fiscal transfers, and 
to accuse him of utopianism in putting too much faith in such a solution. Piketty himself is not 
naïve about the short-run possibilities for a technocratic fix for runaway inequality through the 
actions of some international fiscal authority, seeing his global wealth tax proposal in strategic 
terms as a “worthwhile reference point, a standard against which alternative proposals can be 
measured” (p. 515). Moreover, and more importantly, he also has a more ambitious agenda, 
speaking of the need for a comprehensive democratic capture of capitalism, in which “the 
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concrete institutions in which democracy and capitalism are embodied need to be reinvented 
again and again” (p. 570). This would involve “the development of new forms of property and 
democratic control of capital”, with regard to which “new forms of participation and governance 
remain to be invented” (p. 569).  
 
Piketty is in fact both more ambitious and more realistic than many of his critics give him credit 
for being. What he proposes in fact is a broad and comprehensive research programme that 
would involve finding new ways in which the balance between democracy and capitalism can be 
reset. His extraordinary empirical work shows the background – of increasing inequality, a 
declining labour share of overall economic returns, and an increased role for patrimonial 
inheritance, where today’s entrepreneur becomes the rentier of tomorrow and “the past devours 
the future” (p. 571) – against which this research programme will have to develop. Piketty, 
whose contempt for the “childish passion for mathematics and for purely theoretical and often 
highly ideological speculation” (p. 32) of contemporary economics is entirely creditable and 
admirably refreshing, realises full well that this can only be a broad-based research programme 
across the social sciences, incorporating insights from history, sociology and philosophy as well 
as economics itself. 
 
Before saying a bit more about where the road from Piketty’s remarkable book should lead, I 
want first to take a step back, and to discuss the fascinating relationship between Piketty’s 
weighty volume and an earlier, contrastingly concise book by the economist James Meade. 
Published fifty years before Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, James Meade’s 1964 book, 
Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property is an astonishingly prescient book that is centrally 
concerned with the same problems of inequality that drive Piketty’s work.2  
 
Where Piketty has a team of multinational researchers armed with a wealth of historical data, 
Meade had to make do with no more than some inspired armchair hunches about the evolution 
of capitalism, made all the more remarkable by the fact that he was writing at the very high 
watermark of the Trentes Glorieuses, at a time when the labour share of economic returns was high, 
and inequality was historically low. Gazing into his crystal ball, Meade predicted that the 
relentless consequence of technological advances would be greatly to increase the productivity of 
capital relative to labour. He also suspected that (as Piketty and his colleagues went on to 
demonstrate) inequalities in capital returns between large and small investors would lead to the 
increasing growth of inequality among the holders of capital. Inequality grows as returns to the 
savings of the already-wealthy increase much more rapidly than those of more modest savers, 
even at the same time as the inequality between those with and those without capital holdings 
grows alongside it, creating a doubled force for divergence.  
 
These twin forces of divergence would lead, Meade thought, to what would be a horrific social 
outcome, identical in its main features to Piketty’s prediction of a return to a new Belle Epoque. 
Meade named his dystopia ‘The Brave New Capitalists’ Paradise’. Here is his vivid description of 
it: 
 
 “But what of the future? …  There would be a limited number of exceedingly wealthy 
property owners; the proportion of the working population required to man the 
extremely profitable automated industries would be small; wage rates would thus be 
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depressed; there would have to be a large expansion of the production of the labour-
intensive goods and services which were in demand by the few multi-multi-multi-
millionaires; we would be back in a super-world of an immiserized proletariat and of 
butlers, footmen, kitchen maids, and other hangers-on. Let us call this the Brave New 
Capitalists’ Paradise. 
 
It is to me a hideous outlook. What could we do about it?” (Meade (1964), p. 33) 
 
Meade’s problem – that is, the problem of what could be done to prevent the realization of the 
Brave New Capitalists’ Paradise – is in effect the same as Piketty’s problem of how to stop the 
emergence of a new Belle Epoque. Meade’s solution to this problem was an intriguing one. He 
thought that the state should take any reasonable means necessary to prevent this dystopian 
outcome, pursuing three strategies simultaneously. A single egalitarian aim should be realised by 
a plurality of egalitarian means. Meade’s vision was of a new kind of egalitarian social democracy, 
using a novel combination of both socialist and popular capitalist institutions to create a society 
that combined economic dynamism with a huge reduction in economic inequality. 
 
Firstly, the traditional forms of redistribution through the welfare state should be protected, both 
with regard to transfers to the badly-off and the provision of collective public services. But 
Meade thought that no strategy that did not address the underlying pattern of ownership and 
control of wealth would go far enough. Public policy could not be concerned only with the flow 
of income streams, but with the sources of wealth from which they came.  
 
On Meade’s view, traditional methods of redistribution simply did not go deep enough, dealing – 
after the fact – with the symptoms of underlying inequality, rather than providing a more 
fundamental cure by restructuring patterns of individual and collective ownership within the 
economy. Only the more fundamental strategy could ensure, stably and in the long run, that the 
increase in the capital share of national income would be made to work for everyone, and not 
just for a narrow class of plutocrats. Egalitarian strategy had to be proactive, rather than merely 
defensive. 
 
Meade’s view was that attacking fundamental inequalities of wealth had to involve a double-
barrelled strategy, consisting in the creation of a range of private and public institutions and 
policies, which he brought under the headings of (i) a property-owning democracy and (ii) liberal 
socialism. Instead of the role of the state being to sweep in as an ex post fiscal authority, 
reallocating the hugely unequal rewards of economic activity, the state’s function in shaping the 
economy should instead be to restructure the rules of the capitalist game from the very start, 
through these varieties of both private and public forms of what I’ll call “capital predistribution”.3  
 
Meade’s property-owning democracy involves, in effect, changing the nature of property rights 
such that wealth is much less easily transferable across generations, given that it would be subject 
to high rates of taxation with regard to both inheritance and gifts inter vivos. Wealth would be 
dispersed across the population, with individual capital holdings for all viewed as an entitlement 
of citizenship, and the use of a myriad of mechanisms that would spread the returns to capital as 
broadly as possible. Such mechanisms could take a large number of different forms, including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See, e.g. Martin O’Neill (2012b), “Predistribution: An Unsnappy Name for an Inspiring Idea,” The 
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“the encouragement of financial intermediaries in which small savings can be pooled for 
investment in high-earning risk bearing securities; measures to promote employee share schemes 
whereby workers can gain a property interest in business firms; and measures whereby 
municipally built houses can be bought on the instalment principle by their occupants” (Meade 
(1964), p. 59). The goal would be both to spread capital returns widely across society, and to 
overcome the forces for divergence between larger and smaller investors. 
 
This ‘property-owning democracy’ was, though, just half of Meade’s strategy of (in my terms) 
“capital predistribution”. The other half – his “Socialist State” – involved the creation of forms 
of collective, democratic wealth. Meade envisaged the creation of public institutions akin to the 
sovereign wealth funds that have come to play an increasingly important role in the world 
economy, such as the Alaskan Permanent Fund or, most impressively, the Norwegian Statens 
Pensjonsfond Utland (SPU), a collective investment vehicle that owns roughly 1% of global equities. 
Such forms of public and democratic wealth ownership could be used to fund a citizens’ income 
(as in the Alaskan case), or in any other democratically authorized way that allowed the 
socialization of increasing returns to capital, and the decoupling of individual life-chances from 
excessive dependence on outcomes in the labour market.  
 
Unlike John Rawls, whose own influences from Meade are clear even from the names which he 
gives to different kinds of socioeconomic regime (i.e. property-owning democracy and liberal 
socialism), Meade did not think that we need to choose between private and public forms of 
capital predistribution (and neither did he think that either strategy was a replacement for the 
traditional welfare state).4 Instead, Meade believed that a more egalitarian future would involve 
the state doing three things – (i) strengthening the provision of public goods and income 
transfers through the traditional mechanisms of the social state, whilst simultaneously pursuing 
capital predistribution in both its (ii) individual and (iii) collective forms.  Meade thought that 
what we need “is a combination of measures for some socialization of net property ownership 
and for a more equal distribution of the property that is privately owned” (Meade (1964), 71), 
taken as measures “to supplement rather than to replace existing welfare state policies” (Meade 
(1964), 75).  
 
It is only now, fifty years after the publication of Meade’s prescient classic, that the full force of 
his diagnosis of capitalism’s inegalitarian ills is becoming clear. It may also be time to pay more 
attention to his proposals for how those ills might be cured. 
 
This brings us back to Piketty. In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Piketty describes himself as 
“following in the footsteps” (p. 582) of Meade (and of Meade’s student and Piketty’s 
collaborator, Tony Atkinson). When I discussed these issues with Piketty when he came to 
London at the time of the publication of his book in English, he had this to say about the 
relationship between his thinking and Meade’s proposals: 
 
“James Meade, just like me, believed that progressive taxation and the development of 
other forms of property relationships and of other forms of governance are 
complementary institutions. In the book I probably place too much emphasis on 
progressive taxation, but I do talk about the development of new forms of governance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), and  
Martin O’Neill and Thad Williamson, (2012a), eds., Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond, (Boston, 
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Markets without Capitalism: Political Values, Principles of Justice and Property-Owning Democracy,” in 
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and property structure, but probably not sufficiently. So I agree with that – that can be 
for volume two!”5  
 
Along the same lines, in his recent Journal of Economic Perspectives article, “Putting Distribution 
Back at the Center of Economics: Reflections on Capital in the Twenty-First Century,”6 Piketty has 
returned to what one might describe as the unwritten, Meadean parts of his argument for 
institutional change to combat inequality: 
 
 “I may have devoted too much attention to progressive capital taxation and too little 
attention to a number of institutional evolutions that could prove equally important, such 
as the development of alternative forms of property arrangements and participatory 
governance.” (Piketty, 2015, p. 87) 
 
What Piketty’s painstaking empirical work has shown is that the besetting problems of inequality 
that worried James Meade are as bad as Meade had feared. These tendencies towards shocking 
levels of inequality constitute a deep challenge to the legitimate continuation of capitalism in its 
current form, and will need to be addressed urgently in the years ahead. Contrary to the 
occasional misreporting of Piketty’s forward-looking views, it is no part of Piketty’s view that we 
can rely on a simple technocratic fiscal fix to solve the problems ahead of us. Mechanisms of 
redistribution will not be sufficient, but will have to be supplemented by more radical forms of 
predistributive institutional innovation.  
 
If solutions to the problem of inequality are to be as radical as reality now demands, what is 
instead required is a reimagining of what would be involved comprehensively to tame capitalism 
through democratic means. This will involve much further development of the kind of plurality 
of institutional and policy proposals sketched by Meade, and will involve both the private and 
public – individual and collective – forms of capital predistribution that Meade advocated. 
Piketty, like Meade, sees the need for both redistribution and predistribution, and both see that the 
institutional means necessary to create a more equal society will involve pursuing a plurality of 
parallel paths. It is closely in keeping with the spirit of Piketty’s Capital that the political and 
intellectual agenda ahead will be one that economics on its own cannot hope to encompass. It’s a 
vital agenda, with high stakes, and presents challenges to both academic researchers and political 
activists. On the success of this endeavour depends nothing less than the prospects for legitimate 
continuation of our economic system. 
 
 
 
 
 
For extremely helpful comments on this essay, I am grateful to Robert Lepenies, Michael Rosen, Alan Thomas, and Stian 
Westlake. Thanks to Henry Farrell for the invitation to contribute to this Crooked Timber book seminar. 
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